J. Law Epistemic Stud. (2026) 4: e195

https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22331033

ISSN 3091-1575

RESEARCH ESSAY

Human dignity in the age of artificial intelligence, legal and

technological challenges of the twenty-first century

Dignidad humana en la era de la inteligencia artificial desafíos jurídicos y tecnológicos del siglo

XXI

Javier A. Artiles-Santana iD

Received: 19 June 2025 / Accepted: 11 July 2025 / Published online: 5 August 2026

Abstract This study critically examines the contemporary

reconfiguration of the legal understanding of human dignity in the

digital era and the legal and technological challenges arising from

the increasing incorporation of artificial intelligence systems into

decision-making processes that may affect fundamental rights. The

analysis draws primarily on scientific literature retrieved from

Scopus and Web of Science, complemented by doctrinal,

normative, regulatory, and institutional sources issued by

international organizations. A qualitative documentary design was

adopted, combining legal and philosophical analysis within the

frameworks of legal constructivism and the paradigm of

complexity. The results reveal tensions involving human

autonomy, privacy, equality, non-discrimination, transparency,

accountability, and effective human oversight. From the

documentary analysis, the study develops the construct of systemic

dignity, understood as the dynamic projection of human dignity

within complex sociotechnical environments in which individuals,

legal systems, and artificial intelligence technologies interact. This

construct extends the explanatory and regulatory scope of human

dignity and supports rights-based, adaptive, and multilevel

regulatory frameworks capable of ensuring effective human control

and concrete legal safeguards throughout the artificial intelligence

life cycle. It thereby reinforces the primacy of the person and

protection of fundamental rights in automated decision-making

environments.

Keywords artificial intelligence; human dignity; fundamental

rights; algorithmic regulation; systemic dignity.

Resumen This study critically examines the contemporary

reconfiguration of the legal understanding of human dignity in the

digital era and the legal and technological challenges arising from

the increasing incorporation of artificial intelligence systems into

decision-making processes that may affect fundamental rights. The

analysis draws primarily on scientific literature retrieved from

Scopus and Web of Science, complemented by doctrinal, normative,

regulatory, and institutional sources issued by international

organizations. A qualitative documentary design was adopted,

combining legal and philosophical analysis within the frameworks of

legal constructivism and the paradigm of complexity. The results

reveal tensions involving human autonomy, privacy, equality, non-

discrimination, transparency, accountability, and effective human

oversight. From the documentary analysis, the study develops the

construct of systemic dignity, understood as the dynamic projection

of human dignity within complex sociotechnical environments in

which individuals, legal systems, and artificial intelligence

technologies interact. This construct extends the explanatory and

regulatory scope of human dignity and supports rights-based,

adaptive, and multilevel regulatory frameworks capable of ensuring

effective human control and concrete legal safeguards throughout the

artificial intelligence life cycle. It thereby reinforces the primacy of

the person and protection of fundamental rights in automated

decision-making environments.

Palabras clave inteligencia artificial; dignidad humana; derechos

fundamentales; regulación algorítmica; dignidad sistémica.

How to cite

Artiles-Santana, J. A. (2026). Human dignity in the age of artificial intelligence, legal and technological challenges of the twenty-first century. Journal of

Law and Epistemic Studies, 4, e195. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22331033

✉ Javier A. Artiles-Santana

jartilessantana1@gmail.com

Universidad San Gregorio de Portoviejo,

Manabí, Ecuador.

J. Law Epistemic Stud. (2026) 4: e195

Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) constitutes one of the most

significant technological transformations of the

contemporary era. Its modern development is commonly

associated with Alan Turing’s early reflections on machine

intelligence and with the Dartmouth Conference of 1956,

widely regarded as a foundational moment in the

consolidation of artificial intelligence as a distinct field of

research (Turing, 2009; Arrestegui, 2012).

Since then, AI has progressively transformed numerous

areas of social, economic, and institutional life, including

automation, healthcare, transportation, communications,

education, scientific research, and large-scale data

processing. These developments have contributed to greater

efficiency, expanded analytical capacity, and the

optimization of multiple human activities. At the same time,

they have generated increasingly complex legal and ethical

concerns regarding the possible impact of automated

systems on fundamental values and legally protected

interests, particularly human dignity (Russell & Norvig,

2016; Brundage, 2015).

The rapid expansion of generative artificial intelligence

has intensified this debate. AI systems are now being

incorporated into legally and socially sensitive areas such as

the administration of justice, healthcare, public security,

employment, education, and public services, where

automated recommendations, classifications, or decisions

may have direct consequences for individuals. This

development has strengthened the need to identify legal and

ethical principles capable of reconciling technological

innovation with the effective protection of human rights and

fundamental freedoms (Floridi et al., 2018; Sun, 2018;

Belouali et al., 2020; Ruttkamp-Bloem, 2020; Floridi &

Cowls, 2021; Akula & Garibay, 2021; Wong, 2021;

Heilinger, 2022; Hagendorff, 2022).

Recent scholarship confirms that the legal implications of

artificial intelligence are not confined to isolated

infringements of specific rights. Teo (2025) warns that the

gradual incorporation of AI into social and institutional

decision-making may affect the normative foundations of

human-rights protection itself. This perspective highlights

the need to analyze the relationship between artificial

intelligence and human dignity not only in terms of specific

technological harms, but also in relation to the broader legal

architecture through which human rights are interpreted,

guaranteed, and enforced.

International organizations have progressively

incorporated these concerns into ethical and regulatory

instruments. UNESCO’s Recommendation on the Ethics of

Artificial Intelligence places human dignity, human rights,

fairness, transparency, accountability, and human oversight

among the central principles that should govern the

development and use of AI systems (UNESCO, 2021).

Similarly, the European Union has developed a

progressively binding regulatory framework designed to

ensure that artificial intelligence operates within conditions

compatible with safety, transparency, non-discrimination,

accountability, and the protection of fundamental rights.

Nevertheless, the regulation of artificial intelligence

continues to face substantial challenges arising from the

complexity of the interaction between technological systems

and legally protected rights (Dignum, 2019). Legal and

philosophical scholarship has consequently intensified its

examination of the relationship among artificial

intelligence, justice, human dignity, fundamental rights, and

the rule of law (Llano et al., 2022; Consejo General del

Poder Judicial, 2024). In this regard, Shaelou and

Razmetaeva (2023) emphasize that the emerging digital

legal order must remain subject to rule-of-law guarantees

and to the effective protection of fundamental rights,

particularly where technological systems acquire a

significant role in processes of decision-making and

governance.

Human dignity has historically occupied a foundational

position within contemporary constitutional and

international human-rights law. The Universal Declaration

of Human Rights establishes that all human beings are born

free and equal in dignity and rights, while the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International

Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights reaffirm

the inherent dignity of the human person as a foundational

basis of the international human-rights system (United

Nations, 1948, 1966a, 1966b).

From a philosophical perspective, Kant’s conception of

dignity remains particularly influential. Kant (2012) links

dignity to the rational and autonomous character of the

human person and to the imperative that individuals must

always be treated as ends in themselves and never merely as

means. Under this approach, dignity constitutes an intrinsic

value without equivalent and serves as a normative barrier

against the instrumentalization of the person. This

understanding has profoundly influenced contemporary

constitutional theory and the interpretation of dignity as a

moral and legal foundation of fundamental rights

(Habermas, 2010).

The emergence of increasingly sophisticated artificial

systems has renewed debate regarding the meaning and

scope of dignity in technological environments. Thielscher

(2025) argues that the development of artificial intelligence

requires greater conceptual precision concerning dignity

within computer ethics, particularly in relation to freedom,

autonomy, moral responsibility, and individuality. Although

this debate also extends to questions concerning the possible

moral status of machines, the present study remains

grounded in a human-centered conception of dignity and

focuses on the legal implications generated when automated

systems intervene in decisions affecting individuals.

This intervention creates important legal tensions.

Decisions traditionally dependent on human judgment may

now be adopted, recommended, prioritized, or conditioned

J. Law Epistemic Stud. (2026) 4: e195

by algorithmic systems. Such processes may generate

opacity, discriminatory outcomes, profiling, surveillance,

and difficulties in attributing legal responsibility,

particularly where automated decisions affect access to

employment, social benefits, credit, public services, justice,

education, or other legally protected opportunities and rights

(Müller, 2023).

Bryson (2016) acknowledges that artificial intelligence

may contribute significantly to human welfare by improving

services and strengthening decision-making through the

analysis of large volumes of information. However, its use

also raises fundamental questions regarding autonomy,

responsibility, and the conditions under which technological

systems may influence human conduct. Bostrom and

Yudkowsky (2018) similarly examine the ethical

consequences associated with highly advanced artificial

intelligence systems and the potential risks arising from

insufficient human control.

Coeckelbergh (2020) further warns that technological

development without adequate legal and ethical safeguards

may contribute to processes of dehumanization and weaken

human autonomy. These positions show that the central

legal issue is not whether artificial intelligence is beneficial

or harmful in abstract terms, but under what normative

conditions its design and use remain compatible with the

protection of the person as a bearer of dignity and

fundamental rights.

The relationship between artificial intelligence and law is

also characterized by a significant asymmetry in their

respective rates of development. Technological innovation

evolves rapidly and continuously, whereas legal systems

require comparatively slower processes of legislative

adoption, judicial interpretation, administrative

implementation, and institutional adaptation. This temporal

asymmetry creates difficulties for the timely construction of

regulatory safeguards capable of responding to the risks

generated by automated decision-making.

Yeung (2018) uses the concept of algorithmic regulation

to describe forms of governance increasingly mediated by

automated systems and warns that such arrangements may

affect fairness, accountability, procedural guarantees, and

individual rights. The expansion of algorithmic governance

therefore requires a deeper legal analysis of the relationship

among technology, power, regulation, and the effective

protection of fundamental rights.

This concern is also reflected in recent approaches to

algorithmic governance and People Analytics, which

emphasize the need to embed transparency, accountability,

non-discrimination, and labour-rights safeguards into

digitally mediated organizational decision-making (Esquivel

García & Vargas Mursulí, 2026).

The recent literature reinforces this concern. Orwat et al.

(2024) argue that risk-based regulation of artificial

intelligence faces particular difficulties when legal systems

must operationalize normative principles such as dignity,

informational self-determination, privacy, non-

discrimination, fairness, and justice. This difficulty

demonstrates that the challenge is not limited to identifying

abstract values, but extends to translating those values into

concrete legal obligations, compliance mechanisms,

procedural safeguards, and review structures.

The European Union’s regulatory response illustrates this

shift from general principles toward enforceable legal

obligations. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 establishes a risk-

based regulatory architecture for artificial intelligence and

assigns particular relevance to the protection of fundamental

rights. In the case of high-risk AI systems, the Regulation

requires measures of human oversight designed to prevent

or minimize risks to health, safety, and fundamental rights,

thereby confirming that effective human control constitutes

a core legal safeguard in automated environments

(European Parliament & Council of the European Union,

2024).

Despite these advances, the global regulatory landscape

remains fragmented. Significant differences persist among

jurisdictions regarding the scope, intensity, and

enforceability of AI regulation. In Latin America, for

example, regulatory initiatives continue to display

heterogeneous levels of development and institutional

consolidation (Hernández et al., 2024). This fragmentation

reinforces the existence of a normative gap between rapid

technological innovation and the capacity of legal systems

to provide coherent, effective, and internationally

compatible safeguards.

The problem therefore requires an analytical framework

capable of integrating legal, philosophical, technological,

and ethical dimensions. Legal constructivism provides a

useful theoretical basis because it recognizes that legal

concepts are not immutable, but evolve as social structures,

institutional practices, and normative expectations change

(Dworkin, 1986; Cáceres, 2007).

From this perspective, human dignity may be understood

as a legal construct whose protective function must be

capable of responding to new forms of social interaction

mediated by artificial intelligence. This does not imply

abandoning its classical foundations. Rather, it requires

examining how dignity can continue to operate as a

normative limit and interpretative criterion in contexts

where algorithmic systems increasingly participate in

decisions with legal and social consequences.

The paradigm of complexity complements this approach.

Morin (2002) proposes a dialogical model that makes it

possible to analyze apparently opposing dimensions as

interconnected components of the same complex reality.

Applied to the present study, this requires moving beyond a

fragmented analysis of artificial intelligence and human

rights and examining instead the legal, ethical,

technological, and institutional relations that connect them.

Within this system of relations, human dignity functions

as the principal normative point of articulation between

J. Law Epistemic Stud. (2026) 4: e195

technological innovation and the protection of fundamental

rights. Artificial intelligence systems operate within

complex sociotechnical structures in which legal norms,

ethical principles, institutional practices, technological

architecture, and social consequences interact continuously

(Floridi, 2013). Consequently, AI governance cannot be

addressed exclusively through isolated technological or

legal measures.

The analysis of these relationships makes it possible to

identify four critical areas in which artificial intelligence

may generate particularly significant tensions with human

dignity: automated decision-making and algorithmic

autonomy; privacy and surveillance; equality and non-

discrimination; and transparency and accountability in

governance. In these areas, automated systems may

reinforce structural inequalities, weaken individual

autonomy, obstruct effective review, or affect access to

rights and opportunities when adequate legal safeguards are

absent (Eubanks, 2018).

Recent research on ethics-by-design further strengthens

the need to incorporate rights-based safeguards at the

earliest stages of technological development. Brey and

Dainow (2024) propose integrating human agency, fairness,

transparency, privacy, and responsibility into the design and

development of artificial intelligence systems. This

approach is consistent with the view that human dignity

should not function merely as a remedial principle invoked

after harm has occurred, but also as a preventive legal

criterion capable of guiding technological design before

risks materialize.

On this basis, the study develops the construct of systemic

dignity. Systemic dignity is defined as the dynamic

projection of human dignity within complex sociotechnical

environments, intended to ensure that the design,

deployment, use, and supervision of artificial intelligence

systems remain subordinated to human autonomy,

fundamental rights, legal accountability, transparency, and

effective human control.

This construct does not replace the classical conception of

dignity nor does it modify its fundamentally human

character. Rather, it extends its explanatory and regulatory

capacity to technological environments in which the

exercise of rights, access to opportunities, and institutional

decision-making are increasingly mediated by automated

systems.

Under this approach, dignity acquires not only a

foundational but also an operative function. It may serve as

a legal criterion for the design, implementation, assessment,

supervision, and review of artificial intelligence systems,

particularly where such systems affect fundamental rights or

legally protected interests.

The research is therefore guided by the following

question:

How does artificial intelligence affect human dignity

within contemporary legal systems, and how can systemic

dignity contribute to strengthening legal protection against

the risks associated with automated decision-making?

Accordingly, the general objective of the study is to

critically analyze the relationship between human dignity

and artificial intelligence from legal and philosophical

perspectives and to develop systemic dignity as a

conceptual and normative category capable of strengthening

the protection of fundamental rights in automated

environments.

The relevance of the study lies in the need to develop

legal responses capable of reconciling technological

innovation with the protection of the person. In this context,

this framework is proposed as a theoretical and normative

framework that may contribute to the interpretation,

regulation, and supervision of artificial intelligence systems

where automated processes affect autonomy, freedom,

equality, security, privacy, and other fundamental rights.

Methodology

The research was developed through a qualitative

documentary design, appropriate for examining the legal

and philosophical implications arising from the interaction

between human dignity and artificial intelligence systems.

This methodological approach made it possible to analyze

the problem from a normative, doctrinal, conceptual, and

interdisciplinary perspective, consistent with the objective

of identifying legal tensions and formulating a theoretical

construct capable of responding to emerging technological

realities.

The principal research technique was documentary review

and legal-documentary analysis. The documentary corpus

was composed primarily of scientific publications retrieved

from the Scopus and Web of Science databases, together

with doctrinal, normative, regulatory, and institutional

sources directly related to artificial intelligence, human

dignity, human rights, algorithmic regulation, and

automated decision-making systems. Institutional

documents issued by international organizations,

particularly UNESCO and the European Union, were also

examined because of their relevance to the ethical

governance and legal regulation of artificial intelligence.

The selection of documents was guided by criteria of

thematic relevance, legal significance, philosophical

pertinence, and direct connection with the object of study.

Priority was given to sources addressing the protection of

fundamental rights in technological environments, the

ethical and legal implications of artificial intelligence,

algorithmic governance, automated decision-making,

human oversight, transparency, non-discrimination, privacy,

accountability, and regulatory responses to technological

innovation.

The documentary review was oriented toward identifying

conceptual convergences, doctrinal divergences, normative

tensions, regulatory gaps, and emerging legal criteria

capable of explaining the relationship between artificial

J. Law Epistemic Stud. (2026) 4: e195

intelligence and human dignity. The analysis therefore went

beyond a merely descriptive review of the literature and

sought to determine how the progressive incorporation of

automated systems into legally sensitive contexts may affect

the exercise and protection of fundamental rights.

The study combined a legal and philosophical analytical

perspective. From the legal standpoint, the research

examined rules, principles, regulatory instruments,

institutional standards, and governance mechanisms

concerning the protection of human dignity and

fundamental rights in the context of artificial intelligence.

Particular attention was given to legal safeguards related to

transparency, accountability, non-discrimination, privacy,

human oversight, and the possibility of reviewing or

contesting decisions produced or influenced by automated

systems.

From the philosophical perspective, the research

examined the classical foundations of human dignity and

their capacity to respond to contemporary technological

environments. This dimension made it possible to assess

whether the traditional understanding of dignity remains

sufficient in situations where algorithmic systems

participate in processes capable of affecting autonomy,

freedom, equality, privacy, and other legally protected

interests.

The theoretical and methodological framework integrates

legal constructivism with the paradigm of complexity. Legal

constructivism provided the basis for understanding legal

concepts as interpretative categories capable of evolving in

response to transformations in social, institutional, and

technological realities. Under this approach, human dignity

was not treated as an immutable or closed category, but as a

foundational legal principle whose protective function may

require renewed forms of interpretation when new

relationships emerge between individuals and automated

systems.

The paradigm of complexity, in turn, made it possible to

analyze the relationship among artificial intelligence, law,

ethics, philosophy, technology, and society as components

of a single interconnected system. This perspective avoided

treating technological development and fundamental-rights

protection as isolated dimensions and instead examined the

reciprocal influences that arise between them.

Within this analytical framework, human dignity was

considered the principal normative point of articulation

between artificial intelligence systems and fundamental

rights. This approach enabled the study to examine both

directions of the relationship: how technological systems

may affect legally protected rights and interests, and how

legal principles and human-rights standards may condition

the design, deployment, use, and supervision of artificial

intelligence.

Given the novel and evolving character of the object of

study, the documentary analysis followed an interpretative

and inductive procedure. Through this process, recurring

legal categories, normative tensions, regulatory deficiencies,

and patterns of convergence were identified across the

scientific, doctrinal, and institutional sources reviewed.

The analysis led to the organization of the findings into

four principal dimensions:

Conceptual dimension, focused on the contemporary

meaning and scope of human dignity in automated

environments. Normative dimension, centered on the

regulatory gap between technological development and the

legal mechanisms intended to protect fundamental rights.

Systemic dimension, concerned with the interaction among

artificial intelligence, law, ethics, human rights, and

technological infrastructures. Prospective dimension,

oriented toward governance mechanisms, prevention,

human oversight, legal accountability, and adaptive

regulation. These analytical dimensions structure the

Results and Discussion section and provide the conceptual

basis for the formulation of the construct of systemic

dignity.

The proposed construct was developed through an

interpretative synthesis of the documentary findings. It is

understood as a legal and philosophical construct, rather

than as an empirically measured variable. Its purpose is to

articulate the protection of human autonomy, fundamental

rights, transparency, accountability, legal control, and

human oversight within technological environments

increasingly characterized by automated decision-making.

Accordingly, the methodological approach made it

possible to analyze the relationship between artificial

intelligence and human dignity not merely as a

technological issue, but as a complex legal phenomenon

requiring interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary

interpretation. The combined use of legal constructivism

and the complexity paradigm provided the analytical basis

for understanding dignity as both a foundational principle

and a potentially operative criterion for the regulation and

supervision of artificial intelligence systems.

Results and Discussion

The documentary analysis reveals significant tensions

arising from the interaction between artificial intelligence

systems and the protection of human rights, with human

dignity occupying a central position within that relationship.

The findings are organized into four analytical dimensions:

conceptual, normative, systemic, and prospective. This

structure makes it possible to distinguish the theoretical

implications of AI for the notion of dignity, the regulatory

limitations of existing legal frameworks, the systemic

interdependence between technology and fundamental

rights, and the prospective requirements for future

governance and legal safeguards.

The documentary evidence indicates that the classical

Kantian conception of human dignity, traditionally

understood as an intrinsic and inalienable value inherent in

every person, is confronted with new challenges in the

J. Law Epistemic Stud. (2026) 4: e195

context of artificial intelligence. The traditional notion of

dignity, grounded in human autonomy and rationality and in

the requirement that every person be treated as an end in

themselves rather than merely as a means, acquires renewed

legal relevance when decisions capable of significantly

affecting individuals are adopted, recommended, prioritized,

or conditioned by automated systems (Kant, 2012).

This problem is particularly relevant in legally sensitive

domains such as the administration of justice, public

security, employment, access to social benefits, healthcare,

education, financial services, and social inclusion. In these

contexts, the partial displacement of human judgment by

automated or algorithmically assisted decision-making may

alter the traditional structure through which legal

responsibility, individual autonomy, procedural guarantees,

and the protection of fundamental rights are exercised.

The legal concern therefore does not arise solely from the

existence of automated decision-making as a technological

phenomenon. It arises from the possibility that algorithmic

systems may influence or determine outcomes affecting

rights and legally protected interests without sufficient

transparency, accountability, contestability, or meaningful

human intervention.

Müller (2023) identifies responsibility, autonomy, and

control as central ethical and legal issues associated with

algorithmic decision-making. In a similar direction,

Coeckelbergh (2020) warns that certain applications of

artificial intelligence may contribute to processes of

dehumanization and may undermine individual autonomy

when technological mediation displaces meaningful human

judgment. These concerns become particularly relevant

where affected persons are unable to understand, challenge,

or obtain effective review of decisions produced or

substantially influenced by automated systems.

Recent scholarship further demonstrates that the legal

implications of artificial intelligence may extend beyond

isolated infringements of particular rights. Teo (2025)

argues that the effects of AI may gradually reach the

normative foundations of the human-rights system itself.

This perspective is especially important because it shifts the

analysis from individual technological harms toward the

broader question of whether automated systems may alter

the institutional and normative conditions under which

rights are interpreted, exercised, and protected.

The contemporary debate also confirms that increasingly

sophisticated artificial systems have renewed discussion

concerning the content and scope of human dignity.

Thielscher (2025) identifies freedom, autonomy, moral

responsibility, and individuality among the elements that

must be taken into account when examining dignity in the

field of computer ethics. Although his analysis also

addresses the broader philosophical question of whether

artificial systems could eventually acquire some form of

moral consideration, the present research remains anchored

in the legal protection of human dignity and in the

consequences that technological systems may generate for

persons as holders of fundamental rights.

The findings therefore support the need to reconsider the

contemporary legal functionality of human dignity. This

does not imply abandoning its classical philosophical

foundation, nor does it entail attributing dignity to artificial

systems. Rather, it requires determining how human dignity

can continue to operate as an effective legal principle in

contexts where increasingly complex automated systems

mediate decisions affecting individuals.

In this sense, human dignity should not be understood

merely as an abstract axiological reference. Within

technologically mediated environments, it must also

function as a normative limit to the instrumentalization of

the person, particularly where algorithmic systems classify,

rank, predict, profile, or make recommendations concerning

individuals in ways that may affect their rights or life

opportunities.

This requires examining dignity not only as a

foundational principle of the legal order, but also as a

criterion capable of informing the legality, proportionality,

legitimacy, and reviewability of automated decision-making

processes.

From the interpretative analysis emerges the construct of

systemic dignity, understood as a conception of human

dignity adapted to the increasingly complex relations among

human beings, legal systems, and artificial intelligence

technologies.

this framework is conceived as a dynamic and adaptive

legal-philosophical category. Its purpose is to ensure that

human dignity retains its protective and normative function

in environments characterized by continuous technological

transformation. The construct responds particularly to the

difficulty faced by legal systems in evolving at the same

speed as artificial intelligence technologies.

The rapid development of AI may exceed the response

capacity of conventional legal frameworks. In this context,

the proposed construct seeks to articulate, within the same

normative structure, human autonomy, fundamental rights,

legal accountability, technological development, and

effective human oversight.

Accordingly, systemic dignity does not substitute the

traditional concept of human dignity. Rather, it extends its

practical and interpretative operation into sociotechnical

environments in which technological systems increasingly

participate in decisions with legal and social consequences.

From a dialogical perspective, dignity therefore acts as a

point of connection between artificial intelligence and the

human person. Its function is to permit an integrated

interpretation of technological and human dimensions so

that the protection of fundamental rights does not remain

external to the processes through which AI systems are

designed, implemented, used, and supervised.

J. Law Epistemic Stud. (2026) 4: e195

The complexity paradigm provides an appropriate

framework for understanding the interaction between

artificial intelligence and human rights as interdependent

dimensions rather than as separate systems. Morin (2002)

proposes a dialogical approach that allows apparently

opposing phenomena to be examined as components of the

same complex reality. Applied to the present research, this

perspective makes it possible to analyze technological

development and the protection of fundamental rights as

processes that continuously influence one another.

On one side of this relationship lies the technological

system, characterized by automation, large-scale data

processing, predictive capacity, and increasingly

sophisticated forms of decision support. On the other lies

the human and legal system, structured around rights,

principles, values, responsibilities, and guarantees. Human

dignity operates as the principal normative point of

articulation between both dimensions.

The analysis also shows that the relationship between

technology and law is characterized by continuous

feedback. Technological advances generate new regulatory

demands, while legal norms, institutional practices, and

social values simultaneously influence the design,

deployment, and acceptable use of technological systems.

This reciprocal interaction supports the understanding of

dignity as a concept that must retain its protective function

within continuously changing sociotechnical environments.

Within this framework, the documentary analysis

identifies four critical areas in which artificial intelligence

may generate particularly significant tensions with human

dignity.

The first concerns decision-making and algorithmic

autonomy, especially when automated systems intervene in

access to resources, opportunities, services, or rights. In

these circumstances, the legal concern is whether human

agency, meaningful review, and responsibility remain

effectively guaranteed.

The second concerns privacy and surveillance,

particularly through technological systems capable of

collecting, processing, inferring, and using large volumes of

personal data. These practices may generate risks to

informational self-determination, privacy, and individual

autonomy, particularly where surveillance technologies

operate without sufficient legal safeguards.

The third concerns equity and non-discrimination, due to

the possibility that algorithmic systems may reproduce

historical biases, rely on unrepresentative data, or deepen

structural inequalities through classifications or predictions

that appear technically neutral.

The fourth concerns transparency of governance,

particularly when individuals are unable to understand the

criteria underlying automated decisions, identify the

responsible actors, or effectively challenge outcomes

capable of affecting their rights or legally protected

interests.

Figure 1

Critical areas of tension between artificial intelligence and

human dignity

Source: Author's own elaboration based on the documentary analysis.

These four areas are consistent with the concerns

identified by Eubanks (2018) regarding the automation of

inequality and with the normative challenges examined by

Orwat et al. (2024), who identify human dignity, privacy,

informational self-determination, non-discrimination,

equity, and justice among the principal values implicated in

AI risk regulation.

This convergence reinforces the systemic approach

adopted in the study. The potential effects generated by

artificial intelligence do not operate in isolation. A single

automated decision may simultaneously involve questions

of privacy, discrimination, autonomy, transparency,

accountability, and access to opportunities.

Consequently, the legal analysis of artificial intelligence

requires an integrated perspective capable of recognizing

the interaction among these different dimensions.

Fragmented regulatory responses may be insufficient where

the effects of technological systems extend across several

fundamental rights at the same time.

The findings therefore support the need to approach AI

regulation from a complex, interdisciplinary, and multilevel

perspective, capable of integrating the legal, technological,

ethical, institutional, and social dimensions involved in the

relationship between artificial intelligence and human

beings.

The findings further indicate that the protection of human

dignity in AI-mediated environments requires a regulatory

approach capable of moving beyond fragmented and merely

reactive responses. Given the cross-border nature of many

artificial intelligence systems, exclusively national

regulatory solutions may prove insufficient where

technological design, data flows, deployment practices, and

legal effects transcend territorial boundaries.

A first requirement is the adoption of a preventive

approach. The potential impact of artificial intelligence

systems on human dignity and fundamental rights should be

assessed before deployment, particularly in contexts

involving justice, public security, employment, healthcare,

education, public services, social protection, and other areas

J. Law Epistemic Stud. (2026) 4: e195

in which automated decisions may produce significant legal

consequences.

This preventive orientation is consistent with the ethics-

by-design approach proposed by Brey and Dainow (2024),

which incorporates human agency, fairness, transparency,

privacy, and responsibility into the design and development

of artificial intelligence systems. From a legal perspective,

this approach supports the idea that the protection of dignity

should not operate only as a remedial principle after harm

has occurred, but also as an ex ante criterion capable of

influencing the technological architecture itself.

A second requirement concerns the development of

multilevel governance mechanisms. Cooperation among

states, international organizations, regulatory authorities,

developers, deployers, and other relevant actors may

contribute to establishing common standards for the

protection of fundamental rights in relation to technologies

whose operation and effects transcend national jurisdictions.

This multilevel approach is particularly relevant in light

of the regulatory fragmentation identified in the study. The

existence of substantially different legal standards across

jurisdictions may create uneven levels of protection and

may allow technologically similar systems to operate under

divergent safeguards. Greater regulatory coordination could

therefore contribute to strengthening legal certainty and

ensuring more consistent protection of human dignity.

A third requirement is the development of adaptive

regulatory frameworks. The rapid evolution of artificial

intelligence makes it necessary to adopt legal mechanisms

capable of responding to technological change without

weakening the protection of fundamental rights. Regulatory

adaptability should not be understood as normative

flexibility without limits, but as the capacity of legal

systems to update supervisory, interpretative, and

enforcement mechanisms while preserving non-negotiable

standards of human-rights protection.

A fourth requirement is the guarantee of meaningful

human oversight and control. Russell (2019) emphasizes the

importance of ensuring that artificial intelligence systems

remain compatible with human values and under human

control. UNESCO (2021) similarly places human agency

and oversight among the central elements of responsible AI

governance.

The European regulatory framework reinforces this

approach. Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 expressly requires

human oversight in relation to high-risk AI systems and

establishes that such supervision must be appropriate to the

risks, level of autonomy, and context of use of the system

(European Parliament & Council of the European Union,

2024). This confirms the increasing juridification of human

oversight as a safeguard against excessive or uncontrolled

automation.

The need for effective human control becomes

particularly important in areas in which automated systems

may have substantial consequences for individuals,

including the administration of justice, public security,

surveillance, employment, access to essential services,

healthcare, and other fields involving fundamental rights.

The findings also show that legal responsibility cannot

become diluted merely because a decision is technologically

mediated. The involvement of artificial intelligence systems

does not eliminate the need to identify the persons or

institutions responsible for the design, deployment,

supervision, and consequences of automated decision-

making. Accountability must therefore remain legally

attributable and institutionally enforceable.

Likewise, transparency should not be reduced to the mere

disclosure that an artificial intelligence system has been

used. Effective transparency requires that individuals

affected by automated decisions have access, to the extent

legally and technically possible, to meaningful information

concerning the factors, criteria, or processes that influenced

the outcome, particularly where such decisions affect rights

or legally protected interests.

The possibility of challenging or reviewing automated

decisions is equally important. Human dignity and due-

process guarantees require that individuals should not

remain subject to consequential automated outcomes

without access to effective mechanisms of contestation,

rectification, or human reconsideration.

Floridi (2013) provides a broader ethical framework for

understanding these issues through the ethics of

information, emphasizing the importance of structuring

technological environments in ways compatible with the

protection of persons. From this perspective, the central

problem is not whether technology is inherently beneficial

or harmful, but under what legal and ethical conditions it

may be legitimately developed and used.

Within this framework, this framework acquires particular

relevance as the principal theoretical contribution of the

study. Its function is to articulate the technological

dimension with the legal protection of the person, allowing

human dignity to operate not only as a foundational value

but also as a concrete normative criterion throughout the life

cycle of artificial intelligence systems.

Accordingly, the proposed construct may guide the

assessment of whether an AI system is compatible with

human autonomy, fundamental rights, transparency,

accountability, non-discrimination, and effective human

oversight. It may also serve as an interpretative criterion

when existing legal rules are insufficiently specific to

address new forms of technological mediation.

The construct therefore seeks to bridge the gap between

the axiological dimension of human dignity and the

operational requirements of AI governance. Its regulatory

significance lies in requiring that technological innovation

remain subordinated to the legal status of the person as a

holder of rights and not merely as a source of data, an object

of classification, or the passive recipient of automated

decisions.

J. Law Epistemic Stud. (2026) 4: e195

The principal legal challenge identified by the study is

therefore not to determine whether artificial intelligence

should be accepted or rejected as a technology. Rather, it is

to establish the legal, ethical, and institutional conditions

under which AI systems may be developed and used

without undermining human dignity or the effective

protection of fundamental rights.

The findings ultimately support a model of AI governance

based on prevention, regulatory adaptability, multilevel

cooperation, meaningful human oversight, transparency,

accountability, non-discrimination, and effective

mechanisms of review. Within this model, systemic dignity

operates as the normative point of articulation between

technological development and the continued primacy of

the human person within the legal order.

Conclusions

The study demonstrates that the interaction between

artificial intelligence, human dignity, and fundamental

rights generates legal and technological challenges that

increasingly exceed the response capacity of traditional

regulatory frameworks. The rapid evolution of AI systems

and their progressive incorporation into legally sensitive

areas require legal responses capable of combining

technological innovation with effective safeguards for the

person as a holder of fundamental rights.

Human dignity remains the normative foundation of this

relationship. Its protection cannot be confined to an abstract

axiological declaration, but must inform the design,

development, deployment, use, supervision, and review of

artificial intelligence systems, particularly where automated

decision-making may affect autonomy, privacy, equality,

non-discrimination, access to opportunities, due process,

and other legally protected interests.

The findings confirm that meaningful human oversight

constitutes an essential legal safeguard. Automated systems

should not displace human judgment in contexts involving

significant legal consequences, nor should technological

efficiency prevail over fundamental rights. Transparency,

accountability, contestability, bias prevention, and access to

effective review mechanisms therefore emerge as

indispensable elements of rights-based AI governance.

The analysis also shows that the regulatory challenge is

not limited to the absence of legislation. It also concerns the

capacity of legal systems to translate general principles into

concrete obligations, institutional responsibilities,

compliance mechanisms, and enforceable safeguards. In this

respect, the risk-based approach adopted by Regulation

(EU) 2024/1689 represents an important development

because it links technological risk to the protection of

health, safety, and fundamental rights and strengthens the

juridical relevance of human oversight.

The paradigm of complexity confirms that artificial

intelligence, law, ethics, technology, and society cannot be

treated as isolated domains. Their interaction generates a

sociotechnical environment in which legal norms influence

technological design while technological developments

simultaneously create new demands for legal interpretation,

regulation, and institutional control.

Within this framework, the principal theoretical

contribution of the study is the construct of this normative

category. Systemic dignity is understood as the dynamic

projection of human dignity into complex sociotechnical

environments in which individuals, legal systems, and

artificial intelligence technologies interact. It does not

replace the classical human-centered conception of dignity,

but extends its explanatory and regulatory function to

contexts increasingly mediated by automated systems.

This framework may therefore operate both as a

foundational principle and as an interpretative and

regulatory criterion. Its function is to ensure that

technological innovation remains subordinated to human

autonomy, fundamental rights, legal accountability,

transparency, non-discrimination, and effective human

control throughout the AI life cycle.

The study ultimately concludes that the principal legal

challenge is not to determine whether artificial intelligence

is inherently beneficial or harmful, but to establish the

normative, institutional, and ethical conditions under which

its use may be considered legitimate. A human-rights-based

model of AI governance requires preventive regulation,

multilevel cooperation, adaptive legal frameworks,

meaningful human oversight, enforceable accountability,

and effective mechanisms for reviewing automated

decisions.

Under this approach, this normative category provides a

conceptual basis for preserving the continued primacy of the

human person within the legal order while allowing

technological development to advance under conditions

compatible with fundamental-rights protection.

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Conflicts of interest 
The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.  
Author contributions 
Javier A. Artiles-Santana Conceptualization, data curation, 
formal  analysis,  investigation,  methodology,  supervision, 
validation,  visualization,  drafting  the  original  manuscript 
and writing, review, and editing. 
Data availability statement 
The datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study 
are available from the corresponding author on reasonable 
request. 
Statement on the use of AI 
The authors acknowledge the use of generative AI and AI-
assisted technologies to improve the readability and clarity 
of the article. 
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