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J. Law Epistemic Stud. (July - December 2024) 2(2): 13-17 15
lenges for contemporary criminal justice systems. Its hierar-
chical structure, transnational nature, intensive use of tech-
nology, and capacity for institutional corruption often make
traditional criminal prosecution tools insufficient (Anarte &
Ferré, 1999; Hefendehl, 2004).
Faced with this reality, States have been compelled to
provide the Public Prosecutor’s Office with more effective
mechanisms to address highly complex crimes, such as hu-
man trafficking, money laundering, drug trafficking, corrup-
tion, smuggling, and cybercrimes (Granados, 2001; Arcinie-
gas, 2020).
Within this framework, Argentine legislation has devel-
oped a set of special procedural mechanisms, such as the
undercover agent, the revealing agent, the informant, the
controlled delivery, the repentant, and the extension of ju-
risdiction. These tools have been recognized in reforms such
as Law 27,304 and allow for overcoming the obstacles im-
posed by the secrecy inherent to organized crime. They fa-
cilitate access to evidence, the internal structures of criminal
organizations, and the location of their prominent leaders
(González, 2007).
The digital undercover agent, in particular, represents an
evolution of these tools by adapting to the virtual environ-
ments where many criminal networks operate today. En-
crypted platforms, closed social networks, instant messag-
ing services, and illegal markets on the deep web are used
to commit crimes without leaving easily detectable traces.
Therefore, the possibility of a public official infiltrating a
website with judicial authorization represents an institutional
response to these new criminal scenarios (Guariglia, 2007).
Law 9510, in line with international trends, incorporates
this concept into the Mendoza criminal process and estab-
lishes rigorous requirements for its application. It requires a
reasoned judicial authorization, a time limit, a prohibition on
inciting the crime, and the obligation to preserve the integri-
ty of the evidence (Del Pozo, 2006).
These types of tools, however, are not without their fair
share of challenges. The use of false identities, the simula-
tion of behavior, and the covert collection of information
generate debates about the proportionality of the measure, its
necessity in each specific case, and the risk of eroding fun-
damental rights. Legal doctrine has warned of the need for
these measures to be used exceptionally, preventing the State
from acting with an “enemy” approach that undermines the
guarantee-based criminal justice model (Guerrero, 2013).
Therefore, its implementation must be accompanied by a
system of institutional controls, accountability mechanisms,
and a judicial culture that ensures its use is controlled and
judicially supervised. Furthermore, it is essential to differ-
entiate between the different types of agents: the disclosing
agent acts without inducing a crime and only uncovers illicit
activities; the informant transmits data without intervening;
the repentant collaborates after being arrested. This classifi-
cation makes it possible to specify the scope of the under-
cover digital agent and prevent regulatory and operational
confusion.
In short, the digital undercover agent is part of a modern-
ization of investigative strategies against organized crime.
However, its legitimacy will depend on its use of the prin-
ciples of due process, respect for human rights, and the le-
gitimate purpose of protecting society from complex and
sophisticated threats.
Fundamental rights compromised: privacy and
non-self-incrimination
Implementing the digital undercover agent poses serious
constitutional challenges, particularly about the fundamen-
tal rights to privacy and freedom from self-incrimination.
Both are essential pillars of due process and are recognized
in both domestic law and international human rights treaties
(Martínez, 1994; Madrid-Malo, 2004).
The right to privacy protects individuals’ private spheres
against arbitrary interference by the State. The role of the un-
dercover digital agent, by infiltrating closed virtual spaces,
even in environments that simulate personal or confidential
relationships, can entail access to extremely sensitive infor-
mation without the affected party’s knowledge or opportunity
to defend themselves. This intrusion can violate the principle
of legality if it is not clearly defined and justified by reasons
of strict necessity and proportionality (Martínez, 2001).
Article 19 of the National Constitution and 11 of the
American Convention on Human Rights establish the right
to privacy, honor, and reputation. Likewise, Article 17 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights en-
shrines protection against arbitrary interference. The actions
of undercover digital agents must be interpreted by these
standards, which requires a case-by-case analysis to assess
whether the means employed are appropriate, necessary, and
proportionate to the legitimate purpose pursued (Guerrero,
2013).
On the other hand, the right against self-incrimination im-
plies that no one is obligated to testify against themselves
or contribute evidence that could lead to their conviction.
The actions of the undercover officer can generate situa-
tions where the subject of investigation, believing they are
interacting with a trusted third party, reveals incriminating
information without having been informed of their rights or
having legal advice. This is particularly problematic when
the undercover officer induces or encourages behavior that
would not otherwise have occurred, raising doubts about the
validity of the evidence obtained and the possible configura-
tion of a case of instigation or provocation to commit a crime
(Jauchen, 2005).